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How Do Forecasts Respond to Changes in
Monetary Policy?
BY LAURENCE BALL AND DEAN CROUSHORE
ust as changes in atmospheric conditions
affect weather forecasts, changes in
monetary policy affect economic
forecasts. When monetary policy shifts,
forecasters change their predictions about growth
and inflation. But does the economy change to the
same extent that forecasts do? In this article,
Laurence Ball and Dean Croushore examine
forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
to determine if forecasts and the economy respond
in tandem or if there are significant differences.
1 This paper reports the results of the authors’
joint research.  For additional details of their
research, see their working paper, cited in the
References.
Larry Ball is a
professor of
economics at
Johns Hopkins
University.
Dean Croushore
(pictured left) is a
vice president and
economist in the Research Department
of the Philadelphia Fed.
Forecasts are important
because they affect what people do. If
the weather forecast calls for rain,
people carry umbrellas and cancel
outdoor activities. If the economic
forecast calls for a rise in the
unemployment rate, people will reduce
their spending on consumer goods.
And just as atmospheric
conditions affect weather forecasts,
changes in monetary policy affect
economic forecasts. If the Federal
Reserve tightens monetary policy,
forecasters predict slower economic
growth and lower inflation; if the Fed
eases monetary policy, forecasters
predict faster growth and higher
inflation.  But does the economy change
to the same extent the forecasts do?
To answer this question, we’ll
look at forecasts from a survey of
professional economic forecasters. We’ll
see how the economy responds to a
change in monetary policy compared
with how forecasts respond, to
determine if the responses are identical
or if there are significant differences.1
Why should we care about
whether the economy changes to the
same extent the forecasts do? If forecasts
systematically respond differently than
the economy does to a shift in monetary
policy (that is, to a greater or lesser
degree or with different timing), we
might reach two conclusions: forecasters
are irrational (since a good forecast
should change in the same way the
economy does) and forecasts aren’t
accurate guides to what happens in the
economy when monetary policy
changes.
Such conclusions can have
repercussions. First, if forecasters are
irrational, people will be less likely to
believe their prognostications. Second,
inaccurate forecasts may influence
economic activity indirectly by setting
up false expectations about how
monetary policy will affect the economy.
Acting on those expectations, people
will behave in a certain way. But since
people are misinformed about what
effects monetary policy will have, they’ll
behave in a manner different from how
they’d act if they had better
information. Thus, monetary policy
might affect real output in the economy
partly because people were misinformed
about its effects.
On the other hand, if forecasts
align well with how the economy
changes when monetary policy shifts,
that’s a sign that economic forecasters
are rational.  This alignment also
eliminates the possibility that monetary
policy affects the economy because
people misinterpret its effects.
FORECAST DATA
To investigate forecasts, we’ll
use the Survey of Professional Forecasters
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For more details on these results, see
Croushore’s 1998 working paper and his 1996
Business Review article.
Note:  Dates shown are dates when one-year-ahead forecasts were made; actual is for one year
ahead from date of forecast.  For example, in 1968Q4, forecasters on average predicted that
output growth would be 3.2% between 1968Q4 and 1969Q4; output growth turned out to be
1.9%.
Source:  Survey of Professional Forecasters and authors’ calculations.
FIGURE 1
Mean Output Growth: Forecast and Actual
Growth rate (%)
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For details, see the authors’ 2001 working
paper.
2 
We’ve carried on similar research with the
Livingston Survey of economists and the
Michigan survey of consumers.  In all cases,
the results were nearly the same as those
reported here for the Survey of Professional
Forecasters.
3 
For more details on the survey, see Dean
Croushore’s 1993 article in the Business
Review. All of the survey’s results are
available on the Internet at http://
www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/index.html.
(SPF).2  The survey, which began in
1968, reports the forecasts of economists
throughout the business world, on Wall
Street, and at consulting firms. The
survey asks participants to provide their
quarterly  forecasts for 18 major
macroeconomic variables, including real
GDP and all of its components.  The
survey form typically runs four to six
pages; sometimes the survey includes
special questions, which vary depending
on current economic conditions.
Because of the amount of detail the
survey asks for, economists who
participate in the survey are those for
whom forecasting represents a major
part of their job responsibilities. The
survey, which is run by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, is the
leading quarterly survey of U.S.
economists’ forecasts.3
How good are the forecasts
overall?  If we examine just the average
across the forecasters in the survey, we’d
like to know if that average forecast is
reasonable.  If you wanted a good
forecast for future output growth or
inflation, would these surveys be useful
to you?  The answer is yes. These
surveys almost always pass analysts’
statistical tests for accuracy. For
example, Dean Croushore recently
studied the inflation forecasts from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters and
several other surveys and found that
the SPF forecasts were quite good,
though there were periods in which
SPF respondents made severe forecast
errors. Those periods were most often
associated with oil-price shocks, mostly
in the 1970s and early 1980s, when the
economy performed poorly and inflation
was rising dramatically.4
Figure 1 gives an overview of
how accurate survey forecasts are. It
shows the one-year-ahead forecasts for
output growth made each quarter, from
the fourth quarter of 1968 to the fourth
quarter of 1999, compared with the data
that show what actually happened. (For
example, the forecast made in the
fourth quarter of 1968 predicts output
growth from the fourth quarter of 1968
to the fourth quarter of 1969.  We
compare the forecast with the actual
data over the same period.)  Figure 2
does the same for inflation forecasts. All
the forecasts are looking one year
ahead, and the date the forecast was
made is shown on the horizontal axis.
Figure 1 demonstrates that, for
the most part, output forecasts are good,
in the sense that, on average, the
difference between the forecast and
what actually happened was near zero.5
Consequently, one-year-ahead output
forecasts match up with the data fairly
well. The forecasts aren’t quite as
volatile as the actual data, which is a
characteristic of all good forecasts. But
the general pattern of movement over
time is the same for the two series.
There have been no long periods in
which forecasts were consistently too
high or too low except, perhaps, in the
late 1990s.
In Figure 2, you can see that
inflation forecasts over the past 15 years
were pretty good, but they were much
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The inflation forecasts sometimes missed the
mark, especially when there were big oil-price
shocks, but they were not consistently wrong.
For more on testing for bias in forecasts, see
Croushore’s 1996 article and his 1998 working
paper.
7 
The real federal funds rate is defined as the
nominal federal funds rate minus the
expected inflation rate. Even if the survey’s
expected inflation rate turned out to be
biased, the real federal funds rate defined this
way would still be the correct measure of the
stance of monetary policy because it’s a key
variable that people use in making economic
decisions.
8 
In technical terms, this is called a
univariate time-series model.
FIGURE 2
Mean Inflation: Forecast and Actual
Note:  Dates shown are dates when one-year-ahead forecasts were made; actual is for one year
ahead from date of forecast.  For example, in 1968Q4, forecasters on average predicted that
inflation would be 2.9% between 1968Q4 and 1969Q4; inflation turned out to be 5.2%.
Source:  Survey of Professional Forecasters and authors’ calculations.
Inflation rate (%)
Date
worse in earlier years. In the late 1960s
and throughout the 1970s, forecasts for
inflation were too low, with errors
averaging 1.6 percent; in the early
1980s, inflation forecasts were too high,
with errors averaging 1.7 percent; and
through much of the 1990s, inflation
forecasts were again too high, but the
errors were smaller, averaging 0.8
percent.  Nonetheless, standard
statistical tests suggest that, overall, the
forecasts are not biased, that is, they
weren’t consistently wrong in one
direction or another. Thus, they pass a
simple test for accuracy.6
Measuring Monetary Policy.
Given that the forecasts look fairly good
overall, the question arises: how do the
forecasts respond to changes in
monetary policy? To answer that
question, we need a quantitative
measure of monetary policy. Economists
often use a real interest rate, that is, the
interest rate adjusted for expected
inflation, as a variable for determining
how monetary policy is changing. Since
the Federal Reserve generally operates
by targeting the federal funds rate,
which is the interest rate on short-term
loans between banks, our measure of
monetary policy is the real federal funds
rate.7
COMPARING FORECASTS WITH
REALITY
To see how well the forecasts
compare with what actually happens in
the economy, we’ll break them into
several parts. First, we’ll look at a
benchmark forecast formed using only
past values of output or inflation, to get a
rough idea of how output or inflation
might change if there were no changes
in monetary policy. Then, we’ll compare
each survey forecast with this bench-
mark forecast. Finally, we’ll compare the
survey forecast to what actually
happened in the economy.
A Benchmark for Compari-
son. We’re going to begin our analysis
by using a simple model as a benchmark
for comparison. A simple forecast of
output growth is one based only on past
data for real output growth.8 Similarly,
our benchmark model for inflation
attempts to provide a useful forecast of
inflation based solely on past inflation
rates.
We chose this simple model as
a benchmark because it ignores any past
changes in monetary policy that are
likely to affect output growth or
inflation in the future. Then, by
comparing the forecasts from this
benchmark model with the forecasts
made in our surveys, we can observe, in
principle, how the survey forecasts
respond to changes in monetary policy.
Of course, if monetary policy doesn’t
change, the benchmark model’s
forecasts should be similar to the survey
forecasts.
You might think that these
types of models wouldn’t be very good at
forecasting; however, our tests suggest
that they do very well. When we ran
the forecasts through a battery of tests
(see our working paper for details), they
passed every one.
Measuring the Effects of
Monetary Policy. To see how monetary
policy affects output growth, we’ll look
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at the difference between actual output
growth over the course of the year and
our benchmark model’s forecast for
output growth over the same period.
This difference is called the benchmark
error. If monetary policy’s effects on the
economy are not fully reflected in the
benchmark forecasts, we would expect
to find that changes in monetary policy
are associated with benchmark errors. In
particular, we would think it likely that
tighter monetary policy today (a higher
real federal funds rate) would reduce
future output growth but that our simple
model wouldn’t pick up this effect
because the model doesn’t incorporate
information about monetary policy. So
tighter monetary policy should be
correlated with a negative value of the
benchmark error. Similarly, easier
monetary policy should be correlated
with a positive benchmark error, since
such policy would increase actual
output growth but would not affect the
benchmark forecast.
The simplest way to demon-
strate this is a scatterplot showing the
benchmark error, that is, the difference
between actual output growth and the
benchmark model’s forecast on the
vertical axis and the measure of
monetary policy — in this case, the
change in the real federal funds rate
over the preceding year — on the
horizontal axis (Figure 3a).9   The plot
9 
To be consistent with the timing of the
survey forecasts, and to ensure that the
forecasters knew the value of the measure of
monetary policy at the time their forecasts
were made, we follow this timing convention:
For a forecast made in a particular quarter
(for example, the fourth quarter of 1968), we
look at the change in the real federal funds
rate over the year that ends in the previous
quarter (for example, from the third quarter
of 1967 to the third quarter of 1968). That’s
because the survey forecasts are made in the
middle of the quarter, so the survey
respondents don’t yet know the value of the
real federal funds rate for the quarter in
which they make their forecasts (in this
example, the fourth quarter of 1968).
10  We’ve highlighted this relationship by
drawing a regression line, which represents a
linear relationship between the variables on
the horizontal and vertical axes.
11
 Technically, we ran a regression of the
forecast error on the one-year change in the
real federal funds rate, then tested the
significance of the regressor with an exclusion
test.  The test is slightly complicated by the
fact that the observations are quarterly and
the forecast horizon is one year ahead, so we
must use a Newey-West procedure to adjust
the covariance matrix.  See our working paper
for test details.  We perform all tests at a 5
percent significance level.
shows a clear negative relationship.10
Tighter monetary policy, which is a
positive change in the real federal funds
rate, is associated with negative values
of the benchmark error. A more formal
statistical test confirms that the relation-
ship is statistically significant.11
We also can examine differ-
ences between actual inflation and our
benchmark forecast for inflation. In this
case, tighter monetary policy is expected
to lead to lower inflation than the
univariate time-series model suggests. So
increases in the real federal funds rate
would be correlated with negative
values of the benchmark error. Similarly,
declines in the real federal funds rate
would be correlated with positive values.
When we look at the data on
inflation and changes in monetary
policy, we don’t see a clear relationship,
in part because monetary policy takes
longer to act on inflation than on
output. This suggests that we need to
look at changes in monetary policy from
longer ago. Indeed, if we look at the
change in the real federal funds rate
from two years to one year prior to the
forecast, we see a negative impact, as
expected, though the relationship is a bit
weaker than in the case of output
(Figure 3b). Again, statistical tests
confirm this negative relationship.
Overall, tighter monetary
policy reduces both future output and
future inflation in a way that our
benchmark forecasts do not pick up.
How Survey Forecasts
Reflect Information About Monetary
Policy.  Next, let’s examine how the
survey forecasts reflect the fact that the
economists surveyed make their
forecasts using information about
monetary policy. If they didn’t use such
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Example:  The difference between actual output growth and the benchmark forecast between
1981Q4 and 1982Q4 was -4.3 percentage points and the change in the real federal funds rate
between 1980Q3 and 1981Q3 was 8.0 percentage points. This is the point farthest to the right
in the figure.  Note: A linear regression line is plotted.
Source:  Survey of Professional Forecasters and authors’ calculations.
FIGURE 3a
The Effect of Monetary Policy on Output
FIGURE 3b
The Effect of Monetary Policy on Inflation
One-year change in real federal funds rate prior to forecast date
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Inflation over coming year
Actual minus benchmark forecast (%)
Output growth over coming year
Actual minus benchmark forecast (%)
One-year change in real federal funds rate one year prior to forecast date
(percentage points)
Example:  The difference between actual inflation and the benchmark forecast between 1982Q4
and 1983Q4 was -2.4 percentage points and the change in the real federal funds rate between
1980Q3 and 1981Q3 was 8.0 percentage points. This is the point farthest to the right in the
figure.  Note: A linear regression line is plotted.
Source: Survey of Professional Forecasters and authors’ calculations.
information, we’d expect the survey
forecast for output growth to be similar
to that of our simple benchmark model.
But if survey participants use informa-
tion about monetary policy in setting
their forecasts, the difference between
the survey forecast and our simple
benchmark forecast would vary depend-
ing on whether monetary policy was
tight or easy. In particular, tighter
monetary policy (an increase in the real
federal funds rate) would lead survey
forecasts for output growth to be lower
than our benchmark forecasts. That is,
we’d expect the difference between
these forecasts to be negative. Similarly,
forecasters anticipating easier monetary
policy (a decrease in the real federal
funds rate) would expect growth to
increase. Thus, survey forecasts would
tend to be higher than the simple
benchmark forecasts, so we’d expect the
forecast difference to be positive. Again,
the same type of analysis can be done
for inflation as for output growth.
Let’s repeat the analysis shown
in Figure 3a, but this time we’ll look at
the difference between forecasts for
output growth from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the
benchmark forecasts. The same type of
scatterplot shows a negative relationship
(Figure 4a), which is what we expect.
Tighter monetary policy (a positive
value of the change in the real federal
funds rate shown on the horizontal axis
in the figure) is associated with a
negative forecast difference. This
Survey forecasts of
output don’t fall
enough when mon-
etary policy tightens,
but survey forecasts
of inflation decline by
the right amount.
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FIGURE 4a
The Effect of Monetary Policy on Survey
Forecasts of Output
FIGURE 4b
The Effect of Monetary Policy on Survey
Forecasts of Inflation
One-year change in real federal funds rate prior to forecast date
(percentage points)
Inflation over coming year
Survey forecast minus benchmark forecast (%)
Output growth over coming year
Survey forecast minus benchmark forecast (%)
One-year change in real federal funds rate one year prior to forecast date
(percentage points)
Note:  A linear regression line is plotted.
Source:  Survey of Professional Forecasters and authors’ calculations.
Note:  A linear regression line is plotted.
Source: Survey of Professional Forecasters and authors’ calculations.
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suggests that economists may incorpo-
rate changes in monetary policy into
their forecasts while the simple bench-
mark forecasts can’t do so. The same is
true of inflation forecasts. But, again, we
need to look at changes in monetary
policy from a year earlier to see an
effect, and again the relationship isn’t as
clear as it was for output (Figure 4b).
This time, however, formal statistical
tests show that the negative relationship
isn’t strong enough to be statistically
significant. Thus, monetary policy
doesn’t significantly affect survey
inflation forecasts relative to our
benchmark forecasts.
Overall, tighter monetary
policy may lead survey forecasts of
output growth to be lower than bench-
mark forecasts, but it doesn’t have a
statistically significant effect on survey
forecasts of inflation relative to bench-
mark forecasts.
Are the Survey Forecasts
Rational? We can also compare the
survey forecasts with actual output
growth and inflation. This comparison
indicates whether the survey forecasts
are rational. If they are rational, the
survey forecasts should change in
response to shifts in monetary policy in
the same way that actual output growth
or inflation changes. Otherwise, the
survey forecasts are irrational — that is,
survey respondents could make better
forecasts using the information available
about monetary policy.
To investigate the rationality of
the forecasts, once again we’ll look at
the forecast errors — the difference
between actual output growth or
inflation and the survey forecast for
those variables. If monetary policy gets
tighter (an increase in the real federal
funds rate), both actual output growth
and the survey forecast for it should
decline by the same amount; therefore,
the forecast error shouldn’t be correlated
with monetary policy. The same should
be true of easier monetary policy: there
should be no relationship between a
  Business Review  Q4 2001   15www.phil.frb.org
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FIGURE 5a
Are Survey Forecasts of Output Rational?
FIGURE 5b
Are Survey Forecasts of Inflation Rational?
One-year change in real federal funds rate prior to forecast date
(percentage points)
Inflation over coming year
Survey forecast minus benchmark forecast (%)
Output growth over coming year
Actual minus survey forecast (%)
One-year change in real federal funds rate one year prior to forecast date
(percentage points)
Note:  A linear regression line is plotted.
Source:  Survey of Professional Forecasters and authors’ calculations.
Note:  A linear regression line is plotted.
Source: Survey of Professional Forecasters and authors’ calculations.
measure of monetary policy and the
forecast error for output growth. Similar
results should hold for inflation.
For output growth, we will look
at the forecast error to see if it’s corre-
lated with our measure of monetary
policy. A scatterplot shows a negative
relationship between the forecast error
and the measure of monetary policy
(Figure 5a), which is statistically
significant.  The relationship isn’t as
strong or as large in magnitude as the
relationship shown in Figure 3a, which
suggests that the survey forecasts do
respond to changes in monetary policy,
but not enough. In other words, when
monetary policy tightens, survey
forecasters reduce their forecasts of
output growth, but not by enough to
match what actually happens. Similarly,
easier monetary policy leads forecasters
to raise their forecasts of output growth,
but not by enough to match reality.
What about inflation forecasts?
When we plot the inflation forecast
error against past changes in the real
federal funds rate, there’s a slightly
negative relationship (Figure 5b), but it
isn’t statistically significant. So it appears
that forecasters are able to change their
forecasts of inflation in response to
changes in monetary policy in a rational
way.
In summary, survey forecasts of
output don’t fall enough when monetary
policy tightens, but survey forecasts of
inflation decline by the right amount.
Thus, forecasters are inefficient in
forecasting output when monetary
policy changes.
CONCLUSIONS
What implications do the
results discussed in this article have for
how we think about forecasts and
monetary policy? If the survey forecasts
fail to capture the impact of monetary
policy on output growth, then monetary
policy could have an additional, indirect
effect on the economy; our working
paper presents a formal model in which
16   Q4 2001 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
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this occurs. In particular, some models of
the economy assume that a change in
monetary policy affects the economy
only if the change is a surprise. But even
if a change in monetary policy isn’t a
surprise, its effects may be.  Indeed, our
evidence suggests that this is so. Even
though monetary policy, as measured by
a change in the real federal funds rate,
is readily observable, forecasts of output
don’t fully react to it. And this under-
reaction provides one possible channel
through which monetary policy may
affect the economy.
When we examine simple
benchmark forecasts, survey forecasts,
and actual movements of output growth
and inflation, we find three key results.
First, the survey forecasts and actual
movements of output growth and
inflation change when monetary policy
changes. Both output growth and survey
forecasts of output growth decline when
monetary policy tightens and increase
when monetary policy eases. Second,
there’s evidence that forecasts of
inflation from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters are rational; that is, they
change as much as they should when
monetary policy changes. Third, we’ve
found some evidence that forecasts of
output growth from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters aren’t rational,
since they don’t change as much as they
should when monetary policy changes.
This last result is a bit
surprising. After all, survey participants
provide the best forecasts publicly
available for the U.S. economy. Perhaps
there have been significant changes in
the relationship between output growth
and monetary policy, and forecasters will
eventually modify their forecasts to
reflect that change. But for now, it
remains a mystery as to why we find
that forecasts aren’t fully rational. BR
